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1SDI The Clouded Vision
Evolution of Strategic "New Thinking»
Reflecting on the devastating capabilities of a single nuclear bomb, Albert Ernstem 
warned that as we dnft toward unparalled catastrophe a new land of thin Inn g iS essential if 
mankind is to survive The dual U S -Soviet possession of nuclear weapons has required as 
part of this ’new thinking' an unconventional calculus m figuring the military utility if any of 
these devices This was clearly manifested m the U S decision that it lacked any militarily 
decisive nuclear advantage during the 1962 Cuban missile cnsis despite a 17-1 numerical 
superiority Confronted with mutual vulnerability, both sides spent the next decade vigorously 
researching defensive measures, particularly ballistic missile defenses (BMD) The prospect of 
an offensive defensive aims race convinced the United States and the Soviet Union to agree 
through the 1972 Anü-Ballisüc missile (ABM) Treaty, that effective measures to limit ABM 
systems would be a substantial factor m curbing the strategic arms race and would lead to a 
decrease in the nsk  of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons The United States 
through four subsequent administrations has recognized the operational reality of mutual 
nuclear vulnerability while maintaining a substantial ABM treaty-compliant research effort to 
investigate any promising BMD technologies and guard against a Soviet breakout
President Ronald Reagan drastically altered the nature of U S ballistic missile defense 
efforts on March 23,1983 by calling on scientists to render nuclear weapons impotent and 
obsolete" Defense Secretary Weinberger elaborated on Reagan s own version of new thinking 
four days later, asserting on NBC s Meet the Press that ’ The defensive systems that the 
President is talking about are not designed to be partial (but) thoroughly reliable and total I 
don t have any doubts about our ability to do it Thus were sown the seeds of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI)
Congress has responded by approving a huge growth m spending for BMD research and 
development, quadrupling funding from $1 billion m 1984 to $4 billion m 1988 Ostensibly 
conceived as a long-term research program the SDI officially became an acquisition program in 
September 1987 when the Defense Department approved a plan for rapid "Phase I" deployment 
m the 1990 s of a Strategic Defense System (SDS) composed of hundreds of space based and 
ground-based interceptor rockets Far from the 'total population shield envisioned by the
2President, the goal of the proposed SDS is to partially protect military installations such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) thereby 'complicating'' Soviet attack plans The 
deployment of such a system, however limited in effectiveness would violate the ABM 
Treaty s prohibition on space-based BMD components The Treaty is currently being 
threatened by SDI space based testing, administration attempts at reinterpretation, and mutual 
charges of violations Under pressure from critics, including many m Congress, the DoD is 
presently reconsidering the Phase I plan
After 5 years and more than $13 billion m SDI funding, the nation s strategic nuclear 
policy is at a crossroads With the ABM treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START) hanging m the balance, Congress and the next administration must decide the role of 
strategic defenses in our national security A prudent decision must be based not on rhetorical 
fantasy but on realistic, objective analyses of foreseeable capabilities costs possible Soviet 
responses, the impact on stability and aims control as well as strategic alternatives
As a starting point, policymakers would do well to draw lesson from past ballistic 
missile defense efforts and related arms control decisions
Sputnik to MIRVs
The threat of nuclear-armed ICBMs was spawned by the launch of the first space satellite 
aboard the Soviet rocket Sputnik m 1957 The U S responded by quickly matching the Soviet 
ICBM capabilities, while both sides began researching ballistic missile defense (BMD)
An ICBM can be attacked, theoretically during any of its four flight phases (1) the 
boost phase when the booster rocket is thrusting the payload out of the atmosphere (lasting 3 
minutes or less for modem rockets), (2) the post-boost phase (3-5 minutes) when the bus 
separates from the bumed-out booster and releases its warheads and penetration aids (decoys 
chaff) designed to confound defenses, (3) the midcourse phase (1 5 -2 0  minutes) when the 
warheads and penetration aids travel ballistically m free flight through space at roughly 5 
miles/second, and (4) the terminal phase (1/2 to 1 minute) m which the warheads (re entry 
vehicles) and penetration aids descend through the atmosphere to the target
For an effective defense, it is most desirable to attack the ICBM during the boost phase 
while it still carnes all of its warheads and penetration aids The booster also emits a fiery 
exhaust plume making it easier to track. Not surprisingly then, one of the earliest BMD efforts 
mvolved Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) a system employing hundreds of space 
based missiles carrying infrared homing devices Work on BAMBI was aborted in 1962 due to
3its lack of cost-effectiveness and vulnerability to simple anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) 
including space mines
Work continued m the U S on a system of ground-based nuclear armed interceptors 
the Sentinel, later named Safeguard, system. Largely m response to the deployment of a 
similar system around Moscow, the U S introduced the multiple warhead ICBM (or multiple 
mdependent re-entry vehicle, MIRV) m 1970 with the Soviets following suit five years later 
The deployment of MIRVs gave the U S the ability to overwhelm the ground based Soviet 
ABM system It also precipitated a huge escalation m warheads on both sides while increasing 
the danger of pre-emptive strikes a defensive deployment had naturally mduced an offensive 
response
The ABM T reaty
The U S and Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty m 1972, jointly recognizing the 
reality of mutual vulnerability and the need to restric t defenses in o rder to limit the 
buildup of offensive retaliatory-deterrence forces The Treaty ratified by the Senate 
88-2, was thus a vital ingredient m the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) process which while 
flawed, imposed mutually agreed restraints on the arms race and provided important 
verification, confidence-building and dispute resolution provisions
The ABM treaty does allow for a single site deployment of 100 ground-based 
interceptors Such a system is easily overwhelmed by a combination of saturation (MIRVs) and 
penetration aids such as decoys, chaff and radar jamming This led to the U S dismantling of 
its ABM allowed Safeguard system shortly after deployment m 1974 The situation is the 
same today for the Safeguard-like system deployed around Moscow A ccording to 
C ongressiona l testim ony  m  1987 by L aw rence  W o o d ru ff, D eputy  u n d e r 
S ecre tary  o f Defense fo r S trateg ic  and  T h ea te r N uclear Forces, " th e  Soviets 
have been developing th e ir  M oscow (A BM -allow ed) defenses fo r over ten 
years a t a  cost of billions o f dollars F or m uch less we believe we can still 
p enetra te  these defenses w ith a  sm all num ber o f M inutem en missiles equipped 
w ith highly effective chaff and  decoys And if the Soviets should deploy m ore 
a d v an ced  o r  p ro life ra te d  defense , we have new  p e n e tra tio n  a id s  as 
coun term easures u n d e r developm ent (including) a  new m aneuvering  re 
en try  vehicle (M aRV) th a t could evade in terceptors" *
4The mere possibility of extensive ABM breakout ' drives both sides to research defenses 
and offensive countermeasures The historical and technically simplest response to deployment 
of extensive defenses would be an offensive overcompensation to restore critical strategic 
deterrence capabilities perceived lost to the defense This defense-induced deterrence instability 
was recognized by four successive administrations, Republican and Democratic, who agreed 
that the ABM treaty, as signed m 1972, was vital to our national security
The Reagan Years. SPI
The "Vision" is born
President Ronald Reagan and his closest advisors came mto power with a radically 
different view of the strategic balance and strategic defenses This was clearly reflected m the 
1980 Republican platform which called for regaining overall military and technological 
superiority over the Soviet Umon and the development of more modem ' ABM systems 
High Frontier, a space defense lobby group led by retired General Darnel Graham soon 
unveiled their proposal a "global ballistic missile defense (GBMD) system consisting of 
hundreds of orbiting satellites carrying interceptor rockets allegedly using off-the shelf 
technology and deployable m less than five years ' at an estimated cost of 10 to 40 billion 
dollars 2 High Frontier found an appreciative audience m both Congress and the White House 
Republican Congressman Newt Gmgnch praised the concept as absolutely necessary to our 
survival (giving) us a chance to move past the Russians '2 Vice-President George Bush in 
1983 enthused that ’a lot of good thinking has gone into the High Frontier approach 2 
Defense Department technical analyses, however, reached much different conclusions The Air 
Force Space Division had concluded m 1982 that the High Frontier concept (basically an 
updated BAMBI) has no technical ment and should be rejected."* A separate analysis 
concluded It is the unanimous opinion of the Air Force technical community that the High 
Frontier proposals are unrealistic regarding state of technology, cost and schedule *
At the same time, President Reagan was being personally lobbied on the need to develop 
exotic directed energy weapons (DEWs, i e lasers particle beams) Livermore scientist 
Edward Teller and three longtime Reagan friends (the kitchen cabmet ' o f businessman Karl 
Bendetsen rancher/oilman William Wilson and brewer Joseph Coors) met personally with
5Reagan in urging that the U S develop high tech weaponry to counter Soviet missiles 3 
Another group, led by Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, was pushmg the 
development of space based long-wavelength chemical lasers Teller doubted the effectiveness 
and survivability of the space based High Frontier and chemical laser concepts, touting mstead 
the promise of developing a pop-up short-wavelength X-ray laser pumped by a nuclear 
explosion
Opposing these laser-weapon promoters was the advice and analysis of the Defense 
Departments Science Board and the Presidents own Science Council In 1981 the DoD 
Science Board concluded unanimously that It is too soon to attempt to accelerate space based 
laser development towards integrated space demonstration for any mission, particularly ballistic 
missile defense 1 Two years later on the very day of the President s startling Star Wars 
speech Air Force officials, m testimony to the Senate recommended against accelerating the 
space-based laser program on technical grounds At the same time, a year long White House 
Science Council study of emerging defense technologies (including the X ray laser) delivered a 
report to the President’s Science Advisor, George Keyworth The report (which Reagan was 
apparently never shown) stated emphatically that there were no technologies on the honzon 
allowing a change m the strategic balance 3
It was against this backdrop that President Ronald Reagan presented his program to 
redefine strategic doctrine by making nuclear weapons obsolete It was a proposal which 
flew m the face of technical analysis and advice and which was made without consulting our 
allies or Senior Defense Department officials including the Pentagon s highest ranking scientist 
Under Secretary for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer Hearing of the plan the day 
before the speech DeLauer is reported to have ’exploded m disbelief (and) concluded that 
Reagan and his top policy advisors did not understand what they were proposing 4 It seems 
to clearly have been, as former Presidential science advisor Herb York suggested, An instance 
of exceedingly expensive technological exuberance sold privately to an uninformed leadership 
by a tmy in-group of especially privileged advisors 3
The Vision Blurs
What the President was proposing (at least m public) amounted to a radical shift away 
from the strategic doctrine of deterrence based on mutual vulnerability, to a security posture 
that he claimed "did not rest upon the threat of instant U S retaliation Wouldn t it be better 
to save lives than avenge them7 was his emotionally appealing vision Actual escape from the
6immoral doctrine of deterrence requires confronting the entire arsenal of ever-evolving 
delivery systems, including land- and submarine launched ballistic missiles, bombers and air 
and sea-launched cruise missiles The ballistic missile defenses specifically mentioned m the 
President s speech would address only a portion of the Soviet or U S nuclear capabilities It 
was only after publicly stating his goal (however ill-defined) that he appointed three panels to 
assess the feasibility of achieving it. Again only ballistic missile defenses were addressed it 
seems only Soviet ballistic missiles were to be made ' obsolete ' The findings of the panels 
however were far from an endorsement of achieving even this limited goal
The Defense Technologies Study Team or Fletcher panel (Chairman James Fletcher) 
outlined the magnitude of the problem. Constructing an effective defense would require 
intercepting thousands of Soviet missiles m their boost phase before they release their 1000 s 
of warheads and 100 000 s of decoys Interception m the critical but bnef boost phase would 
require space based defenses orbiting above Soviet territory and would involve critical 
technologies ' that the panel estimates would take 10 to 20 years to research and develop with 
no certainty of success Battle management would also be daunting, requiring very large 
(order o f 10 million fines o f code) software that operates reliably, safely and predictably 
(and) maintenance free for 10 years 6 The panel also touched on the obvious problem of 
survivability and crisis stability The report concludes that survivability is potentially a senous 
problem for the space based components The defenses themselves (along with critical 
command and communication satellites) would be easier targets than ballistic missiles The 
panel added that, the mutual occupancy of space by both sides is potentially an unstable 
situation , recognizing that the mutual possession of effective defenses and/or anti-satellite 
weapons would award a huge advantage to the side striking first m times o f crisis - hardly a 
desirable situation The panel noted that protecting the defenses themselves from attack could 
require massive shielding and as feasible sources suggested that material from the lunar 
surface or from asteroids can be brought to the vicinity of the Earth ' It is certainly no surprise 
then that the panel reportedly concluded that it is not technically credible to provide a ballistic 
missile defense that is 99 9 percent leakproof Still m a report to the Senate, panel chairman 
Fletcher stated m sufficiendy ambiguous language that by taking an optimistic view  we 
concluded that a robust BMD system can be made to work eventually
The two other Presidentially-appointed panel groups were assigned to study the policy 
implications of new defense technologies The Miller Panel ( Frank Miller Chairman) has not 
issued a public report The third group, The Future Security Strategy study team or Hoffman
7Panel (Fred Hoffman, Chairman) did issue such a report In it they paid little attention to the 
prospect or implications of near-perfect defenses, instead concentrating on enhancing 
deterrence through 'partial systems with more modest technical goals'
In March 1984, Defense Secretary Weinberger released summaries of the Fletcher and 
Hoffman reports with the Administration conclusion that "a robust BMD system can be made to 
work eventually" To this end, the Administration announced a five year research program - a 
fraction of the 10-20 years deemed necessary by the Fletcher Commission The SDI program 
was officially bom The strategic and technical goals of the program, however remained 
confused. Was it a program to replace "mutual assured destruction” by 'mutual assured 
survivability" as former SDIO director L t  Gen Abrahamson suggested to the BBC m 1984? 
Was its purpose to develop the population shield repeatedly alluded to m public by the 
President (recalling again that it deals only with ballistic missiles)? It seemed so This is an 
opportunity to devise and ultimately deploy a system that can mdeed render impotent nuclear 
weapons and remove that shadow and that fear from the Earth for the first time since these 
nuclear weapons were developed ' asserted Defense Secretary Weinberger to the National Press 
Club May 1 1984 At the same time, both Weinberger and Abrahamson were also conceding 
that an "intermediate goal" of SDI would be partial defenses to protect offensive retaliatory 
forces, thereby allegedly enhancing deterrence rather than replacing i t
Was this limited goal of enhancing deterrence with partial BMDs strategically sound? 
Was it necessary? The four previous Administrations had all agreed on the destabilizing nature 
of BMDs The Fletcher panel warned of the destabilizing effects of mutual deployment of 
space weapons The President had requested m 1983 that The Commission on Strategic 
Forces, the Scowcroft Com m ission, review the Administrations proposals for strategic 
defense The Commission concluded that research perm itted  by the ABM T reaty  is 
important m order to ascertain the realistic possibilities which technology might offer as well 
as to guard against the possibility of an ABM breakout ’ ? This was precisely the view of the 
four previous Administrations The Commission also warned that The S trateg ic  
im plications o f ballistic missile defense and  the criticality  of the  ABM T reaty  
to fu r th e r  a rm s con tro l agreem ents d ic ta te  ex trem e cau tion  in proceeding to 
engineering developm ent in this sensitive a rea  The Commission further examined 
our retaliatory deterrent capabilities including the threat to our land-based ICBMs, the so-called 
"window of vulnerability' It concluded that " to  deter such su rp rise  attacks, we can 
reasonab ly  rely  both  on o u r o th e r s tra teg ic  forces an d  on the range  of
8operational uncerta in ties th a t the Soviets w ould have to consider in p lanning 
such agg ression" To deal with the perceived threat to land based missiles, the 
Commission recommended a combination of mobile ICBMs and arms control measures 
Released m March 1984, The Scowcroft Commission report stood m opposition to even the 
reduced goal o f the SDI program - protecting retaliatory, ground-based ICBMs with 
deployment of BMDs Again, however, it seems that sound strategic analysis and advice was 
ignored
In an attempt to clarify the strategic and technical questions relevant to SDI the U S 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) commissioned m 1984 a background paper 
by Physicist and Space Defense expert Ashton Carter Carter noted that the strategic vaganes 
of the SDI program inhibited any assessment of progress toward a specific goal He also 
pointed out the critical im portance of distinguishing between capabilities a t the 
device and  system  level For instance, hit-to-kill interceptors (hitting an RV with a 
nuclear tipped missile) were proven possible m the 1960 s Devising a system to manage and 
accomplish the interception of 1000 s o f RV s m the midst of 100,000 s of decoys while 
dealing with chaff, radar jamming, nuclear bursts and attacks on communication centers and 
defensive components themselves is an entirely different task This is a  point consistently 
missed o r ignored by SDI advocates
The Carter report also addressed an obvious truth exploited by Star Wars advocates from 
Casper Weinberger to the current, often quoted "authority on the subject, techno-thnller author 
Tom Clancy Ignoring again the mynad of other, ever evolving offensive delivery systems 
one cannot prove that some unknown future technology will not enable a near perfect 
protection of the U S population against future Soviet ICBMs just as one cannot "prove the 
nonexistence of a unicorn Weinberger, Clancy and others have used this truism to dismiss 
critics of the astrodome vision of SDI as nay-sayers comparable to those who doubted man s 
ability to fly, reach the moon or build the atomic bomb Their faith m American technology 
boarders on theologie, perhaps being best summed up by fellow believer and former SDI 
Director Lt. Gen Abrahamson s comment I don t think anything m this country is technically 
impossible We have a nation which mdeed can produce miracles Such reasoning betrays 
senous misunderstandings about the prospects for a near-perfect defense First, there is a 
c ritic a l d iffe ren ce  betw een overcom ing  th e  p re d ic ta b le , te s ta b le , well- 
c h a rac te rized  co n stra in ts  im posed by n a tu re  an d  abso lu tely  defeating  the 
efforts of an equally resourceful, reactive adversary  Secondly, any  technical
9breakthroughs are at least as likely to aid the offense in attacking and defeating 
any defense The awesome power of the bomb has already stacked things in 
favor of the offense. The possible future development of the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser 
might well turn out to be better suited for strategic offense and attacking defenses than for 
defense itself And thirdly, in trying to assess the effectiveness of a defense, one 
is not confronting a static, known quantity but rather a dynamic, evolving 
threat of uncertain capabilities attacking in untestable circumstances Thus while 
not being able to ’prove' it, the Carter report, m agreement with previous government panels 
finds no foreseeable technology as holding promise for a perfect or near-perfect defense It 
makes the further, important recommendation that the prospect for perfect or near 
perfect defense is so remote that "it should not serve as the basis of public 
expectation or national policy "
As for limited defenses, the Carter report agreed with the Scowcroft Commission in 
questioning the wisdom of their development and pomted out that m assessmg any possible 
system one must consider vulnerability of all the components, susceptibility to future Soviet 
countermeasures, and cost effectiveness relative to these countermeasures It also noted the 
dangerous connection between any advanced BMD concept and future anti-satellite (ASAT) 
systems which could give either side the ability to pre-emptively attack critical space based 
systems including command, control and communications (C^) satellites A more 
comprehensive OTA study, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies, followed the Carter report 
and supported its conclusions, specifically noting that assured survival of the population 
appears to be impossible if the Soviets choose to deny i t  This study, too found that the 
degree of effectiveness for any future ballistic missile defense system is impossible to judge at 
this time, requiring much more research on sensors, command and control, system 
architecture, survivability, computer software and countermeasures The report endorsed the 
importance of the both sides adhering to the ABM treaty and recommended any research be 
earned out m accordance with the ABM Treaty guidelines
The findings and recommendations of the Scowcroft, OTA and other concurring studies 
went largely unheeded - suffering the fate of previous Defense Department Science Board and 
Presidential Science Council reports Instead, the confused, promotional rhetoric continued to 
escalate, along with Congressional funding By 1985, the officially stated "central purpose 
of SDI was "not to replace deterrence but to enhance it" ( DoD report to Congress) This meant 
that "For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of
10
nuclear re ta lia tion  will rem ain  the key elem ent o f de terrence" (SDI National 
Security Decision Directive 172 May 1985) On the other hand, Casper Weinberger was 
reporting to Congress in 1986 that the defense that might evolve from the research program 
will not be intended to defend our strategic weapons systems 8 instead, it is Protecting 
people (that) holds out the promise of dramatic change This clear purpose of the President 
has been repeated time and time again by Cap Weinberger Bud McFarlane and myself 
George Keyworth told an audience o f aerospace contractors m 1985 Defense industries 
quickly lined up m support of the program for which cost estimates, (including that of James 
Schlesinger Secretary of Defense under Nixon and Ford) ran m the $1 trillion range for full 
scale development and deployment This figure looks increasingly prescient today m contrast 
to the $50 - 100 billion cost-goals consistently advanced by SDI-advocates
The Hype
U.S. Technological "B reak th roughs". The lack of coherent compelling technical 
and strategic arguments drove the SDIO into a public relations campaign designed to 
demonstrate breakthroughs” m BMD devices (note devices not systems) In June 1984 a 
$300 million effort culminated in the highly touted Homing Overlay expenment a single 
successful (after 3 failures) exo-atmosphenc interception of a dummy warhead by another 
missile While this did prove the ability to sometimes intercept an RV with a non-nuclear 
missile under controlled circumstances it bears little relation to the system  capabilities required 
to defeat an actual attack as noted before A year later, the SDIO bounced a low powered 
laser beam off a mirror on the space shuttle, proving nothing new but generating favorable 
press response including TV pictures and headlines hailing the "success for Star Wars
Perhaps the most effective manipulation of public perceptions and expectations was the 
September 1985 demonstration of a chemical laser at the White Sands missile Range in New 
Mexico The inefficient, long-wavelength chemical laser had been deemphasized as a space 
based BMD concept two years earlier due to the huge, delicate mirrors and tons of fuel 
required This makes it a large expensive, vulnerable target and a better candidate for a 
ground-based weapon against space based components For the public demonstration, a stage 
of a retired Titan booster was strapped down with high-tension cables A laser was then 
focused on the missile until the cables snapped and the booster flew apart, giving the
11
impression that it had exploded. SDIO-supplied videotapes of the event were dutifully shown 
on the TV networks, with no explanation o f what had really happened or what it proved. 
Lasers had long been able to burn holes m metal 'It demonstrated the lethality of this 
technology \  Gen Abrahamson told Congress In public, it was hailed as a world class 
breakthrough
The X-ray laser promoters were not to be outdone In 1983, Livermore scientist Edward 
Teller wrote to White House Science Advisor George Keyworth that we are now entering the 
engineering phase of X-ray lasers" 9 This was a gross exaggeration and still not true five years 
later In December 1984, Teller told high-level Reagan administration officials that the new 
"Super Excalibur" X-ray laser concept could make these weapons many times more powerful 
than ordinary nuclear weapons so that 'a smgle X ray laser module the size of an executive 
desk, could shoot down the entire Soviet land based missile force Teller than wrote to 
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane that he wished "to prevent any possible 
forthcoming agreement with the Soviets that might impede our work Teller protege and 
fellow Livermore scientist Lowell Wood advanced their cause with an April 1985 briefing to 
CIA director William Casey, entitled ' A Technological Race for the Pnze of the Planet 
Keyworth chimed m telling a Livermore audience m 1985 of the possibility that a smgle X 
ray laser could defend against the USSR's entire offensive forces and thereby make it 
unrealistic for the Soviets to counter with an arms race Finally, m October 1985 Roy 
Woodruff, director of the Livermore X ray laser program resigned over his thwarted attempts 
to correct such "overly optimistic and technically incorrect misrepresentations
The "R ed  Shield” . The promotional hype of incredible innovations and the 
’incredible pace" of technical progress m SDI has been complimented by another hype fear of 
an impending "Red S hield"^  which could soon disarm America, a Star Wars gap The need 
to counter such an ominous threat became a major ingredient m the why" of SDI
The 1983 edition of the Pentagon publication Soviet M ilitary Power devoted only four 
paragraphs to Soviet improvements m their early warning radars and the ABM allowed 
Moscow system, with no mention of possible ABM breakout Following the President s 
speech, and the storm of criticism which greeted it, the 1984 edition suddenly concluded that 
the Soviets could deploy a national ABM system within a decade The following year the State 
Department Report to Congress on Soviet Noncomphance with Arms Control Agreements 
charged that the Soviets ’may be preparing an ABM defense of its territory The main element
12
in the Administration s argument has been the construction of the phased-array (electronically 
steerable) radar m Krasnoyarsk, Central Siberia This radar was the sixth in Ime of the 
’’Pechora-class' large phased-array radars (LPAR) being constructed m the Soviet Union The 
previous five radars were located along the country's periphery and onented outward, as 
permitted by the ABM Treaty for early warning radars Such radars are prohibited, except for 
space tracking and verification, from covering one s national territory due to possible ABM 
battle management capabilities
The Krasnoyarsk site is located several hundred miles away from the boarder of 
Mongolia and points northeast to the Bearing Sea, covering a large area of Sibena m clear 
violation of the ABM Treaty s restrictions on early warning radar placements While neatly 
filling m a gap of coverage left by the previous five early warning deployments, the Soviets 
attempted to pass the Krasnoyarsk radar off as a space tracking station SDI advocates have 
insisted instead that it is an ABM battle management radar and a key component in an imminent 
Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty This is contradicted by a 1984 CIA report concluding 
that the Pechora-class radars (including the Krasnoyarsk) were low frequency radars suitable 
for long-range early warning detection and not well designed for ABM battle management 
The CIA report pointed out the radar's susceptibility to nuclear-burst blackout its vulnerability 
to direct attack and, finally, that the location and orientation were not appropriate for defense of 
nearby missile fields CIA officials testified to congress m 1985 that these radars are 
large, fixed installations vulnerable to attack.
A U S  Congressional delegation to the Krasnoyarsk site m 1987 supported the CIA s 
findings The visit confirmed that the radar was designed to operate at low frequencies was 
shoddily constructed and not hardened against attack It concluded, as did the CIA that it was 
constructed for early warning and not for ABM battle management as claimed by SDI 
advocates, or space-tracking as some Soviet officials had claimed. Due to its location it is a 
violation - however militarily insignificant of the ABM Treaty and should as the 
Administration insists, be dismantled. The Soviets for their part have repeatedly offered to 
dismantle it m exchange for the dismantling of the disputed U S LPAR early warning 
installations in Thule, Greenland and Flyingdales, England debatable violations of the ABM 
Treaty but certainly ones which we would push if the roles were reversed.
The unfounded charge of the Krasnoyarsk radar being a component m an imminent 
nationwide ABM system has been paired with exaggerated claims of Soviet progress m ballistic 
missile defense technologies Administration officials including former Secretary of Defense
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Weinberger and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 
Richard Perle, repeatedly claimed in 1985 and 1986 that the Soviets were ahead in the 
deployment and technology of strategic defense", m some cases by ten years Weinberger and 
Abrahamson both claimed that the Soviets were ' clearly ahead ' m the area of chemical lasers 
These claims are flatly contradicted by the findings of the Defense Department which holds that 
of the 20 technologies critical to ballistic missile defense, the U S leads m 14 and is roughly 
even in the other 6 Abrahamson himself admitted that 'in the technologies needed for a 
broader defense - such as data processing and computer software - we are far far, ahead. $ 
The most recent SDIO report to Congress estimates that the Soviet Union is 10 years behind m 
critical sensor technologies
All this has not deterred SDI advocates such as Robert Jastrow from the Marshall 
Institute (a pro-SDI follow-on to the High Frontier group) and Congressman Jack Kemp from 
sounding the breakout" alarm Jastrow alleges m the February 13 1987 National Review 
that a Soviet plan for nationwide ABM deployment m the early 1990's gives the U S about 
five years before our nuclear deterrent is emasculated." We must then, he pleads, deploy 
defenses immediately without, m the words of Jack Kemp "researching the problem to death ’ 
Such hysterics, typical of many SDI promoters, have no basis m technical or strategic reality
Statements on Soviet spending for strategic defense have also been misleading In 
promoting more money for SDI, the Administration often cites the estimated $20 billion spent 
annually on Soviet strategic defenses - the "Red Shield ' Any estimate of Soviet spending is 
necessarily highly conjectural These estimates, moreover, mclude $15-18 billion yearly for air 
defenses Sayre Stevens, former CIA deputy director for intelligence, explains the huge Soviet 
air defense effort as a reaction to "the terrible air raids that the Russian people suffered during 
WW n  (and )the commitment by the Soviet leadership to protect the homeland from the 
terrible ravages that it had suffered, a commitment made stronger by perceptions of Soviet 
unpreparedness at the outset of the war Despite this effort, the U S remains confident in 
our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses as Lawrence Woodruff, Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces testified to the House Armed Services 
Committee m March 1988 The low-observables technology will enable our bombers and 
cruise missiles to penetrate Soviet defense for the foreseeable future '1 The spending of 
billions of dollars on upgrading the ABM-allowed ballistic missile defense around Moscow 
has been equally futile, as attested to by Woodruffs 1987 Congressional testimony mentioned 
previously
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The Soviet Union obviously maintains a large BMD research program m addition to 
maintaining its limited, ground based ABM-allowed deployment around Moscow There is no 
basis however for the alarmist warnings of an imminent Soviet deployment of a nationwide 
BMD system, or even of a Soviet effort m this direction comparable to the SDIO programs 
Such an effort would require a multi-layered defense including orbiting, space based weapons 
and sensors The SDIO s own analysis concludes that the Soviet Umon is far behind m critical 
technologies necessary for any attempt at a nationwide missile defense
The Umted States has long had a robust BMD research program of its own, with 
funding at roughly $1 billion annually before 1983 The five years of the SDI program have 
been characterized by greatly accelerated spending driven by false images of a population 
shield manipulative misrepresentations of U S technological breakthroughs’ and 
exaggerations of Soviet efforts and capabilities The calm, reasoned, strategic and technical 
analyses of many groups, such as the Scowcroft Commission and the OTA, have meanwhile 
been largely ignored by policymakers
The next Administration and Congress face key policy choices regarding BMD testing 
development and possible limited deployment Prudent decisions must be based on realistic 
foresighted analyses of the wide range of relevant technical and strategic considerations, 
including the impact on deterrence- and cnsis-stability m general and the ABM Treaty and 
START talks in particular These considerations are further defined and developed in the 
following sections
Technical and Strategic Considerations of Ballistic Missile Defense 
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
Directed Energy Weapons. DEWs including lasers and particle beams are 
expected to play a leading role m any possible attempt at defense against future Soviet ballistic 
missiles This motivated the American Physical Society (APS) to untiate an exhaustive and 
detailed study on the science and technology of directed energy weapons The study was 
conducted by a group of leading scientist from universities and major government and industry 
labs including the Air Force Weapons Lab, Sandia National Lab, Lawrence Berkeley Lab and 
Bell Laboratories The group members many of whom were actively engaged in SDI
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research were granted complete access to classified information Their conclusions, released 
in 198712, were unanimous
On specific technologies, the report finds
- "M ost crucial elem ents requ ired  for a  DEW  system  need im provem ents 
of several o rd ers  o f m agnitude (factors o f 10)” - including beam  pow er, and 
su p p o rtin g  technologies such as space pow er system s, beam  co n tro l and  
delivery, sensing, track ing , and  d iscrim ination
- The chemical laser is judged to be very problematic m terms of increasing power 
space-based feasibility and survivability
- The eximer laser is seen to be somewhat more promising but requiring at least four 
orders of magnitude (10,000) improvement m power
- Free electron lasers are also seen as more promising but requiring improvements m 
power and 'validation of several physical concepts "
- Nuclear-explosion-pumped X-ray lasers still 'require validation of many physical 
concepts" before their potential as BMD devices can be evaluated.
- Many performance aspects of the neutral particle beam (NPB) must be improved by 
orders of magnitudes for effective use as a BMD device Such devices could be used only in 
the emptiness of space due to atmospheric interactions Use of the NPB for interactive 
discrimination ( identifying the warhead in a sea of lighter decoys during the midcourse phase) 
also requires many further developments including fast accurate beam steering for rapid 
retargeting
Electron beams (or any charged beam) have difficulty due to beam deflection by the 
earth s magnetic field Such beams also require improvements m power and propagation 
^stances of several orders of magnitude
- Sophisticated phase correction ' techniques are required to enhance the beam character 
of laser devices These techniques demonstrated at low powers, must be scaled up by many 
orders of magnitude Such extension to high power and large apertures has yet to be 
demonstrated.
- Further correction techniques, again unproven at high powers are needed to correct 
for atmospheric propagation in the case of ground-based lasers
The report noted that sca ttering  m the a tm osphere  res tric ts  the m inim um  
a ltitude  a t w hich a space-based laser can a ttack  a rising ICBM  in the critical 
boost phase This severely limits the capabilities of space lasers, particu larly  a
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pop-up X -ray laser, in a ttack ing  fu tu re  fast-bu rn  boosters Adverse weather 
conditions can drastically degrade laser beam propagation
The APS report details the senous problems remaining for optical mid-course tracking 
and discrimination of warheads as they travel m a veil of decoys through space at roughly 8 
kmVsec In addition, the large housekeepmg power requirements for the operation of the many 
space platforms will be a problem likely requiring orbiting nuclear reactors
The essential matter of survivability is found to be highly questionable Many space 
based components would have damage thresholds much lower than the hardened boosters 
post-boost 'buses , and RVs they are attempting to destroy The optical mirrors sensors and 
radar dishes are particularly sensitive and would be exposed during times of engagement or 
alert Such com ponents w ould be very vu lnerab le  to a ttack  by ground- and  
space-based  D EW s, space-based  rockets, space m ines, an d  d irec t ascent 
nu c lea r and  non-nuclear an tisa te llite  (ASAT) w eapons F u rth e rm o re , space 
p latfo rm s move in pred ictab le  o rb its  allowing easier ta rge ting  These fac to rs 
all con tribu te  in m aking space based BMD com ponents easier to a ttack  than  
ballistic missiles The APS report cites the pop-up X ray laser as a special threat to space 
based sensors electronics and optics
Finally, the report observes that due to the the long time required to develop and deploy 
an effective ballistic missile defense the offense will have a considerable time to respond with 
countermeasures, including attacks on the defenses themselves Any BMD system must 
th e re fo re  be designed no t fo r to d ay 's  th re a t, b u t ra th e r  fo r a p ro jec ted , 
u n p re d ic ta b le  fu tu re  th r e a t  An u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f su rv iv a b ili ty  an d  
counterm easures is thus absolutely critical in assessing the technical feasibility 
and  cost effectiveness o f any defenses
In summary, the APS panel concludes "W e estim ate tha t even in the best of 
circum stances, a  decade o r m ore of intensive research  w ould be req u ired  to 
provide the  technical knowledge needed fo r an inform ed decision about the 
po ten tia l effectiveness and  surv ivab ility  o f d irec ted  energy w eapons systems 
In  a d d itio n , th e  im p o r ta n t issues o f o v e ra ll sy stem  in te g ra tio n  an d  
effectiveness depend on inform ation th a t, to o u r knowledge, does no t exist
The plethora of difficulties to be overcome in the development of an effective sumvable 
DEW system led former Defense Secretary Harold Brown to comment recently that directed 
energy weapons seem more difficult than they did five years ago ' Despite this or more likely
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because of this, the last two years have seen a shift in SDI funding pnonty away from long­
term research (the professed purpose of SDI) and mto development of interceptor rockets for 
"early deployment"
Space-Based Interceptors (SBIs). Any effective, extensive BMD system must be 
able to attack an ICBM during their bnef (£5 minutes) boost stage before it releases its 
warheads and penetration aids "Of all the layers, the first is the most important - that's the 
boost phase architecture ', points out former SDIO director Abrahamson Space-based 
interceptor rockets have been repeatedly considered and rejected as ineffective boost-phase 
BMD weapons - from BAMBI m the 1960's to High Frontier m the 1980’s Independent and 
government studies (except those done by High Frontier and the Marshall Insanite) have 
consistently shown the futility and vulnerability of such systems A recent study by the 
Strategic Defenses Group at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory *3 concluded that an 
orbiting armada of several thousand SBIs (as proposed in Phase I") would be at best 20% 
effective against the projected Soviet ICBM fleet of 14,000 ICBM warheads m the mid-1990s 
This assessment is made assuming no attack on the defenses, a 90% kill probability for each 
interceptor, perfect battle management and interceptor launch 20 seconds after Soviet launch 
leaving no time for the human decisionmaking critical m case of false alarm It further 
showed, m agreement with previous studies, that SBIs would fail completely against a 
responsive Soviet deploym ent o f fast b u rn  boosters (less than 90 seconds) 
technology well within Soviet capabilities Former SDI Deputy Director Louis Marquet 
attested to this point m 1987, saying "fast-bum boosters could nse up and deploy their 
vehicles before kinetic energy interceptors could reach them."1 A deploym ent of SBIs 
w ould leave the U S w ith an  expensive, ineffective, h a ir-tr ig g e r system  while 
p ressuring  the Soviets in to  expanding and  m odernizing th e ir ICBM  forces even 
fu r th e r
The vulnerability o f space-based interceptors has been an unsolved problem since 
contributing to the cancellation o f the BAMBI program m the 1960 s No solution has been 
found to simple measures such as nuclear or non-nuclear space mines (armed satellites that 
track enemy satellites) A 1988 OTA report on SDI Technology, Survivability and Software 
concludes that "direct-ascent nuclear anu-satelhte weapons (nuclear ground-launched missiles) 
would pose a significant threat" In addition, the OTA finds that "T here  has been little
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analysis o f any k ind  of space-based th rea ts  to BMD system  surv ivab ility  In 
p a rticu la r, SDIO and  its co n trac to rs  have conducted no serious study of the 
situation m which the United States and  the Soviet Union both occupied space 
w ith com parable BMD system s" a potentially unstable situation warned of by the 
Fletcher Panel four years agof The APS DEW panel noted that developments in directed energy 
weapons for ballistic missile defense would more likely be effective m attacking any space 
based assets The situation is summed up m Livermore scientist George Miller s statement that 
'survivability  o f objects m space has not even been conceptually solved " 1
B attle M anagem ent
The problem of managing the huge network of command, control and communications 
(C3) mvolved with a defensive network is often considered to be the most intractable of all 
The network would be tasked with detecting, tracking and discriminating 100 000 s of rapidly 
moving targets and directing the battery of BMD weapons m a coordinated attack on a dynamic 
array of elusive targets - all this m an environment of nuclear bursts and attacks on the defense 
and components The OTA concluded that " No adequate models for the development, 
production, test and maintenance of software for full-scale BMD systems exist It would be a 
system of complexity well beyond anything now existing Due to this complexity, there would 
always be significant uncertainty m its dependability The OTA noted that even existing large 
software systems, such as the telephone system, become reliable only after operational use and 
repeated modification OTA concludes that " there would be a  significant 
probability  th a t the first (and presum ably only) tim e the BMD system  were 
used in real w ar, it would suffer a catastrophic failure " A Pentagon official 
responsible for was even more blunt, noting recently that "SD I com m and and control 
is a  to tal and  complete d isaster we spent $600 million and  have nothing to 
show for it W e can 't show, except for w hat I call view -graph engineering, 
how it is supposed to work even for Phase One " 1 (the early deployment plan 
recently approved, now being reconsidered by the DoD)
C o sts
The accelerating costs of SDI have totaled over $13 billion the past five years - this in 
times of tighter budgets and huge deficits SDIO is claiming it will need another $45 billion 
through 1993 m order to make an 'informed decision ' The estimated costs of achieving Phase
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1 deployment have also escalated. SDIO Director Abrahamson testified m March, 1987 that 
Phase 1 deployment would cost $40-60 billion It rose to $70-100 billion by September 1987 
for 'an minai pamally capable but very impressive deployment" By February, 1988 the cost 
"estimate" reached $75-150 billion ^  This estimate is for development and deployment only 
of Phase I technology and does not mclude the additional billions o f dollars to be spent on 
DEW and other advanced technologies Regular maintenance and operanonal costs of any 
deployment will add an addmonal several billion dollars annually Cost estimates for the 
follow-on "Phase II " system (imagined to mclude space lasers and more advanced sensors and 
interceptor rockets) run m the $500 billion range The total life cycle costs for these dubious 
systems would likely approach the $1 trillion All these BMD efforts and expenditures would 
soil not address the ever-evolving Soviet bomber, air- and sea-launched cruise missile forces 
Defense against these, if ever feasible, might well cost as much as SDI
Space Launch Considerations
Any attempt at deploying and maintaining space based battle stations will require a huge 
increase m U S launch capacity The Umted States launched roughly 350,000 pounds into 
orbit m 1985, the year before the Challenger tragedy SDIO estimates SDI deployment will 
require lifting up to five million pounds mto orbit annually Meeting cost and schedule goals 
would require SDIO to mercase launch capacity by more than ten fold while decreasing launch 
costs by a factor of 10 1* The Air Force is understandably pessimistic Deployment would 
inevitably mercase SDIO's competition with other military, scientific and civilian payloads for 
available cargo space
Effect on Deterrence- and Crisis-Stability
It is now accepted, even within the Administration that near-perfect defenses will be 
unattainable for the foreseeable future, if  ever One must judge SDI deployments, then on the 
ments of a limited ballistic missile defense Any defensive deploym ent, w hether 
g ro u n d - o r  sp ace -b ased , n a tu ra lly  induces u n c e r ta in ty  m  th e  offensive 
re ta lia to ry  d e te rren t capabilities o f the opposition This p ressures a  response 
to resto re  capabilities perceived lost to the defense This instability motivated the 
ABM Treaty
The Soviets could respond to a BMD deployment m a number of ways including 
deploymg offensive countermeasures such as fast-bum boosters, penetration aids and anti-
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satellite weapons (AS ATS), all of which would defeat foreseeable defenses at a fraction of the 
cost (though one must be careful in calculating relative costs - history shows that the projection 
of even our own costs m such matters is wildly inexact) They could also choose to further 
expand their bomber, and air- and sea-launched cruise missile capabilities The responsive 
deployment of ASATs would be particularly destabilizing, threatening critical C3 satellites as 
well as any space-based BMD components
Limited defenses would be much more effective against a depleted, second strike 
retaliatory ICBM attack the unilateral deployment of defenses could reasonably be seen by the 
Soviets as development of a U S first strike potential, thus putting pressure on the Soviets 
themselves to pre-empt m times of crisis President Reagan himself noted this m the original 
Star Wars speech, saying I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and 
raise certain problems and ambiguities If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed 
as fostering an aggressive policy and no one wants that There is, of course, no plan for the 
U S  to nd  itself of its offensive retaliatory deterrence forces The mutual deployment of space 
weapons and ASATs also poses obvious problems for crisis stability by, again, giving great 
advantage to the first striker Incredibly, neither the SDIO or its contractors have seriously 
studied this issue according to the latest OTA report
The profound effect of BMD deployments and ABM Treaty-abrogation on Europe and 
the NATO Alliance should also be considered. The development and deployment of U S and 
Soviet defenses would mduce uncertainty m the mdependent deterrent capabilities of Britain 
and France Doubt would also nse in the concept of U S extended deterrence m Europe 
These uncertainties would grow with increasing U S and Soviet BMD capabilities The 
development of BMD technologies could drive an anti tactical-ballistic missile ( ATBM) and air 
defense competition, further eroding the Western European nuclear deterrent Such 
developments could severely stram the Alliance (as well as our budgets) and jeopardize any 
progress currently being made m diffusing the East-West confrontation
Strategic Options
The latest justification for deployment of limited defenses is to enhance deterrence by 
confusing Soviet war planners, thereby adding uncertainty to any Soviet pre emptive attacks 
As Lawrence Woodruff has pomted out our vast and varied retaliatory capabilities coupled 
with the huge operational uncertainties already inherent m any such Soviet plan make the 
addition of any confusion totally unnecessary Pre-emption incentives are better reduced
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through thoughtful arms control agreements eliminating ’first strike ’ weapons such as highly 
accurate multi-warhead ballistic missiles m favor of single-warhead missiles
The deployment of BMD defenses would add to uncertainty and instability m space as 
any technology developed and deployed for BMD puiposes would more likely be effective 
against space assets including critical C3 satellites Such would be the case even for limited 
systems ostensibly designed for protecting against accidental launch (a problem better 
addressed through a cooperative program to deploy post-launch destruction systems similar to 
those on NASA and test rockets) Both the U S and Soviet Union are increasingly dependent 
on satellites for early warning of attack, communications, and intelligence (including 
verification) The development of BMD technology with its inevitable ASAT potential is a 
direct threat to these functions and thus to crisis stability This is further reason for the 
importance of the ABM Treaty
To remain effective, the ABM Treaty must be updated and strengthened to eliminate 
loopholes and ambiguities raised by evolving technologies Advances in radar and sensor 
technology have blurred the lines between communications, early warning and ABM 
components The definitions o f ’’research” vs development”, ”ABM component’ 'ABM 
capable” and testing "in an ABM mode” must be clarified, as the Soviets have requested, in 
order that strict, verifiable limits be se t The overlap and restriction of destabilizing AS ATs 
should also be considered.
The ABM-allowed research program should be redirected back to the pre 1983 purpose 
of rigorously, yet calmly, investigating the long-term potential of emerging technologies for 
both defenses and countermeasures The countermeasures effort has been a miniscule and 
diminishing pnonty m SDI This prevents complete, honest appraisals of the effectiveness of 
technologies emerging from our own research and demes us measures which might be needed 
to counter Soviet efforts about which this administration speaks so ominously The neglect, 
under the SDI program, o f the critical questions of BMD survivability and effects on cnsis 
stability must also be redressed.
Conclusion
The 1987 Defense Acquisition Board approval of SDI's "Phase I" deployment 
epitomized the dogmatic, promotional approach of the program smce its misconception five 
years ago The approval was given despite conclusions m a report of the DoD's own Science 
Board that the plan was so "sketchy that neither its pnce nor effectiveness could be
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determined. These criticisms were omitted from the version of the report advanced to the 
Acquisition Board ^  This action was consistent with previous Admimstration/SDIO 
responses to a wealth of critical, objective analysis performed within and outside the 
government during the past five years As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated m 1987 The 
basic decision that we wanted to deploy has been made long ago In conjunction with the 
Phase I decision, $600 million m contracts were awarded for development of space based 
interceptors The present reconsideration of this ’plan” is the latest illustration of the 
spasmodic nature of the program s spending and management.
Robert McFarlane, in the 1988 Fall issue of Foreign Affairs sees the Star Wars debate 
as bemg polarized between "the romantic and manipulative hyperbole of the administration (of 
which he was a leading figure) and the flatly dismissive ihetonc of scientists who should have 
known better The pomt is they did know better They realized that the reality of U S Soviet 
mutual nuclear vulnerability will endure for the foreseeable future despite as described by 
James Schlesinger*?, the Administration s reckless words (and) loose rhetoric regarding the 
' immorality of deterrence These 'flatly dismissive" scientists, many of whom have worked 
on defense-related problems including the Manhattan Project, have always supported, and 
continue to support, a healthy ABM-allowed research program as existed under the four 
previous administrations They recognized, as did the previous administrations, the adverse 
effects of BMD deployments on deterrence and cnsis-stabihty and the importance of a viable 
ABM Treaty In SDI they rightly smelled a rat a program which has been technically and 
strategically misguided from the beginning, a triumph of dogma ideology and manipulative 
hyperbole ' over well-reasoned analyses
The recent ad-hoc rationalizations that SDI has produced commercial spin-offs while 
coercing the Soviets into the START talks are particularly lame A program spending billions 
of dollars per year on exotic-weapons research and development should be judged by its impact 
on our national security It is unquestionably a most inefficient way to fund non weapon 
R&D Weapons research diverts private and government resources both minds and money 
from much more commercially and scientifically productive efforts The attempt to give any 
other impression is simply more deceitful rhetonc This is particularly relevant in these times 
of concern about economic 'competitiveness ' As for pressuring the Soviets on arms control 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has had proposals for strategic reductions on the table since 
assuming power m 1985 The SDI program and its threat to the critical ABM Treaty has been a 
constant and major impediment to progress The Soviets recognize that meaningful, lasting
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reductions are impossible without resolving the SDI/ABM issue The U S  has been 'kicking 
the can down the road" to borrow the phrase of arms negotiator Max Kampelman - and 
squandering billions of dollars in doing i t  One hopes the next Administration and Congress 
will ' know better"
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